Iran’s Nuclear Saga
By Fauzia Qureshi

IRAN's possible development of nuclear weapons has acquired a central importance in the US foreign policy. The importance of proliferation is enhanced by the potential to reshape the politics and security of an already turbulent and volatile region. There is further consideration to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

If there is a proliferation then who is responsible for it? Do nuclear States like the US oppose proliferation simply out of concern for their citizens’ safety or is there something more strategic at work? But why do countries want nuclear weapons? What will happen if Iran really goes nuclear?

Iran has been a party to the NPT(Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) since 1970, but in 1996 congressional testimony, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch stated that Iran was actively pursuing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. In August 2002, the media reported the existence of a pilot uranium enrichment centrifuge plant in Natanz. Two other enrichment facilities were alleged to have begun operations in 2000 near the villages of Lashkar-Abd and Ramandeh, about 40 kilometres west of Tehran.

The former site was found by the IAEA to contain an active laser programme that could be used for uranium enrichment. Iran itself, in February 2003 informed the IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency) director general of work on two enrichment facilities at Natanz, a pilot plant nearing completion and a commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant under construction. Iran stated that more than 100 of the 1,000 planned centrifuge casings had been installed at the pilot plant. The commercial enrichment facility was described as being planned to contain more than 50,000 centrifuges, with installation beginning in early 2005.

Iran introduced gaseous uranium hexafluoride into the first centrifuge for testing purposes in June 2003, and in August the same year, a ten-machine small cascade started test operations. In February 2003, the Iranian Government also reported the existence of an enrichment test-bed facility in the Kalaye Electric Company’s workshop. However, it refused to grant permission for environmental sampling at the site, when significant modifications were noted. IAEA inspectors found traces of HEU(Enriched Uranium) at the Natanz plant in June 2003 and in Kalaye workshop in September the same year.

Iranian officials stated that these traces had been on the equipment when it was purchased from another country, thus denying the production of HEU at the plants. Evidence collected by the IAEA implicated Pakistan as a supplier along with China, Russia and DPRK(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). Let’s not forget that Russia has extended close co-operation to Iran in building power nuclear reactors in Bushehr.

Another element of the Iranian nuclear programme is a planned heavy-water reactor and its ancillary facilities in Arak, a city close to Isfahan. Iran declared to the IAEA in May 2003 its intention to build a 40 MW heavy-water moderated and cooled, and natural-uranium fuelled, Iran Nuclear Research Reactor(IR-40). Its basic purpose stated is to produce radioisotopes, as well as reactor research development and training.

There is also a heavy-water production plant in Khondab, near Arak site. A related facility is Iran’s fuel-manufacturing plant in Isfahan, which will fabricate the fuel elements for IR-40 and perhaps ultimately for the Bushehr nuclear power-plant; whose construction began in 2003. It is interesting to note that heavy-water reactor operates with natural uranium fuel, plutonium can be produced without a uranium enrichment facility.

India and Israel based their nuclear weapons programmes on such reactors. A French Government document provided to the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) in May 2003 concluded that Iran was concealing a military programme within its civilian nuclear programme. However, the Iranian Government denied this allegation. The US claims that the Iranian nuclear programme is technologically broad based, includes redundant facilities, and is well dispersed across many different sites.

This is particularly advantageous of a centrifuge enrichment-based programme for any country pursuing a covert capability. In contrast to plutonium production reactors, centrifuge facilities can be built as small-scale distributed facilities that are especially difficult to detect. The IAEA of governors in September 2003, set a deadline of October 31st, 2003, for Iran to provide extensive additional information on its nuclear activities and to suspend all further uranium enrichment related activities.

Iran in October 2003 promised to freeze all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, provide full information to the IAEA, and open all requested facilities. It signed the Additional Protocol to NPT in December, the same year, which strengthens IAEA inspection rights.

However, the IAEA claimed that Iran’s compliance was characterized by attempts to limit the scope of the agreement and threats to cancel it. Iran announced in June 2004 that it would resume centrifuge production in response to an IAEA resolution critical of its cooperation with the agency. It is also proclaimed by the International Community especially the US that Iran’s missile programme has also received help from China, Russia and DPRK. Additional support has been obtained from companies in Macedonia, Taiwan and Belarus.

The Israeli sources have also claimed that a follow-on missiles-for-centrifuges technical exchange barter deal was struck between Pyongyang and Tehran. Under this putative arrangement, the DPRK provided Iran with engines for the Nodong missiles(the precursors of the Iranian Shahab-3 missile) and worked out Shahab-3 manufacturing problems.

The Iranians provided assistance with uranium enrichment to DPRK. Time and again, Iran has insisted that it has a burgeoning population of nearly 67 million, which is likely to double in 20 years or so, thus it needs nuclear energy. Gas and oil are non-renewable resources, and, therefore nuclear energy seems a suitable alternative in fields of agriculture, industry, health and mining sectors. However, the US alleges that Iran is rolling in petro-dollars and their oil wealth is financing much more than words.

Everyone knows that Iran caricatures the US as the ‘Great Satan’ whereas, the US includes it in the ‘axis of evil’ states. Infact, the US antipathy goes back to the Iranian Revolution and the ‘unfinished business’ of more than two decades of hostile relations. The US has not forgotten the humiliating detention of the American Embassy staff in Iran for 444 days. This episode still rankles deep in the American consciousness.

Iranian leaders’ motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons are not easily accessible to outsiders. If the US is concerned about Iran’s behaviour, such as its support for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, then, Iran too is concerned about its security concerns vis à vis Israel. The US for many years has not only practised its containment policy against Iran but also supported expatriate groups bent on overthrowing the regime in Tehran, including through violent means. Regime change has been a recurrent theme in the US policy as it has been consistently in the policy of Israel.

With US military power next door, Iran is insecure as never before. Iran feels that it is Israel that calls the real shots for the US policies in the Middle East. It is in reality the Israeli security-enhancing script that is being enacted by weakening or changing regimes-Iraq, Iran, possibly Saudi Arabia. Infact, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had programmed the invasion of Iran in one big sweep the day after Iraq was crushed.

More important to Iran is the matter of power and presence in the Persian Gulf.  With the defeat of Iraq and with rising risks of turmoil in Saudi Arabia, is in a better position to compete for pride of place in the Gulf. Of course, Iranian nuclear weapons could be a card to play in a contest for influence.●

© 2005 Fauzia Qureshi