Looking beyond the Atmospherics
By Shireen M Mazari

NOW that the hoop-la has receded and the dust settled post the Pakistan-India cricket series and the leaders’ Summit in New Delhi, where does Pakistan stand substantively on the issues existing between itself and India? Not very far from where it started when the dialogue process resumed in 2004. So why is there so much euphoria?

The Indian game has been, from the beginning, to engulf Pakistan in superficial “feel good” atmospherics with cricket diplomacy, people-to-people contacts and Bollywood appeal, while remaining entrenched in its traditional posturing on the real conflictual issues like Kashmir and Baglihar — unless it becomes imperative to move a notch on these counts.

A few symbolic moves have been made as the recent statement by the Indian Prime Minister regarding the sanctity of the Indus Water Treaty and how he would certainly look into the Baglihar Dam issue if the technical infringements of the Treaty were pointed out to his Government! Considering that Pakistan has been pointing these issues out to the Indians since the mid-90s, it seems a little strange that the present Indian Government is not aware of them — especially since the last bilateral talks on the issue were held in December 2004!

Now that the World Bank has moved on the Baglihar issue and identified three experts from which Pakistan and India are to choose, India has decided to buy time by suggesting that it might propose a neutral expert to monitor the Baglihar flows! Why India is prepared to do anything to avoid the World Bank-appointed expert from examining the issue of the Dam construction is not difficult to fathom. And its ploys only make it even more apparent that on ground India has contravened the Indus Water Treaty.

On Kashmir, of course, the Indians have recognised that they cannot simply continue to hold on to their present policies in an intransigent manner. However, they have made it equally clear that they will not allow for any “redrawing of borders” as they see it. The Indian position now seems to be to build CBMs relating to Kashmir so that eventually Pakistan and the Kashmiris forget the conflictual dimension and de facto accept the status quo. Hence India seeks more bus services trade across the LoC.

In a statement in the Lok Sabha this week, Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh declared that India’s stand on the LoC remained unchanged from the one taken at the 1972 Simla Summit that the “LoC is to be respected.” That is as great a falsehood as any, given that the Indian Government immediately destroyed the Simla Agreement by moving into Siachin and across the LoC in the Qatar and Chor Bat La sectors.

In any event, beyond the CBMs, India is clearly not prepared to seriously discuss any alteration in the status of Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir as part of any overall settlement of the issue. So we have not seen any positive substantive movement from the Indians on this core issue. Meanwhile, the Indians are creating lobbies within Pakistan to support opening up of trade and greater interaction between the States and civil societies, so that Kashmir gradually recedes into the background. But for that to happen, India knows that the military struggle within Occupied Kashmir must also cease totally.

While India continues to pursue its own agenda with Pakistan, where are we headed? Of course, peace has many dividends, but the present course does not promise long-term substantive peace. What is particularly disturbing is that there seems to be a disconnect in our India policy. While we are being overwhelmed by the atmospherics, India continues to temper its peace overtures with hostile signals – most recently exemplified by the revelation of Indian plans to hold war games near the Pakistan border.

According to news reports quoting the ISPR, India has also chosen not to formally inform Pakistan, in advance, about these exercises. As the ISPR spokesman stated, “We do not have any notification regarding these exercises by India.” Coming almost immediately in the wake of President Musharraf’s visit to New Delhi, this move hardly creates a sense of trust between the two countries.

The impact of the Indian position on relations with Pakistan was also clearly visible on certain portions of the joint Pakistan-India statement of April 18, 2005. If one scrutinises the statements of Natwar Singh in an interview given to Outlook just before President Musharraf’s arrival in India and the Joint Statement of 18th April, some of the similarities are uncanny. For instance, Singh talked about India’s offer of a mechanism “for allowing interaction at some select points between people on both sides of the LoC.”

He also expressed the Indian desire for the start of “pilgrimages across the LoC to Hindu, Muslim and Sikh shrines”, adding that India had “also proposed trade and cultural interaction across the LoC.” Point 7 of the Joint Statement stated that the two sides, “also agreed to pursue further measures to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LoC including agreed meeting points for divided families, trade, pilgrimages and cultural exchanges.” Now where in either text is there any reference to the principle of self-determination or resolving the Kashmir issue keeping in mind the wishes of the Kashmiri people? Nor is there any mention of the contentious issue of the Indian contraventions of the Indus Waters Treaty through the Baglihar Dam and the Kishan Ganga project.

Again, Singh declared that “there must be no going back on the peace process” and the Joint Statement declared that “the peace process was now irreversible.” Are our positions on Kashmir and other conflictual issues finally moving towards the Indian positions? Perhaps that is why Pakistan’s Navy Chief has declared that talks were on with India for cooperation in naval defence (The News, 29th April 05).

While he was looking into the future, the fact that we are already talking on such cooperation in the field of defence seems, at the very least, a trifle disturbing. After all, our external threat perception and weapons procurement rationalisations all focus on India. Even our nuclear capability has been rationalised in terms of defence within a bilateral context targeting India. So how on earth can the Pakistan Navy conduct joint defence with India, unless our threat parameters have altered now?

This why there seems to be a major disconnect in our India policy. There appears to be no progress on Kashmir in terms of any tangible movement towards conflict resolution. What we are seeing is Indian efforts to effectively leverage its entrenched position on cores aspects and manage the conflict through CBMs like the Bus Service and potential trade and meeting of divided families.

But President Musharraf has correctly stated, time and again, that Pakistan is seeking conflict resolution not conflict management. So far, the Indians have shown no sign that they want to meet us on that goal. Are we, then, willy nilly shifting our own goal posts in an effort not to disturb the superficial “feel good” milieu the Indians seem to be so successful in creating?●

© 2005 Shireen M Mazari