South Asia & Nuclear Arms Control
By Shireen M Mazari

HOW Disarmament and arms control have tended to be lumped together quite erroneously, because in some cases the latter can actually hinder the former. In any case, the two are conceptually distinguishable — while arms control refers to curbs on acquisition of new weapons or ceilings in existing weapons, disarmament refers to a qualitative reduction in total number of existing weapons with the intent to totally disarm, either in terms of specific weapons systems or as in the notion of General and Complete Disarmament (G&CD).

Now the UN Charter has, in many ways, undermined the latter since the principle of collective security and collective defence has been enshrined within it - especially under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII. So the international community’s effort has been to focus on nuclear disarmament.

This, in my view is neither tenable nor desirable, given the massive destructive capability conventional weapons are acquiring — especially with the development of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and so on. Also, since the international community has not outlawed war per se, all efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament have had a dual purpose:

First, in the case of developed States, especially the P5, arms control (AC) has evolved primarily in terms of economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In fact, when new weapon systems come into conflict with existing arms control measures, there are moves to either re-negotiate these measures, or to simply undermine hem altogether, as in the case of the US-Soviet ABM Treaty.

Second, with reference to the case of developing States, especially States like Pakistan and India, efforts at arms control have been aimed at technology denial rather than at overall reduction of arms — hence the focus primarily on nuclear weapons.

Now, coming to the issue of nuclear disarmament, it may be an ideal goal but it will not happen on the ground, nor is it desirable for countries like Pakistan, at least as long as conventional imbalances exist and war is seen as a legitimate instrument of State policy.

Even NATO sees nuclear weapons as vital ‘glue’ for the integrity of the alliance. So one needs to explore other options, if one is seeking to distinguish between nuclear and conventional arms and arms control. These options need to relate more to stabilisation of nuclear balances where they exist through appropriate arms control measures.

Since the issue at hand is the context of Pakistan and India, there needs to be a two-track approach, bilateral and multilateral, on the issue of nuclear arms control — the aim being to stabilise the deterrence and develop risk reduction of unintended or accidental war. And in that sense arms control, if undertaken in a balanced and rational manner, can reduce the arms race dynamic.

The underlying premise is that a first step by the international community has to be to accept the nuclearisation of South Asia through a Protocol to be attached to the NPT, which both India and Pakistan can sign accepting NPT rights and obligations as nuclear weapon States.

After all, the intent was to keep a flexible approach on the NPT — that is why we have the Review Conference device. Pakistan and India should volunteer to sign Additional Protocol 11 of the Tlateloco Treaty, which commits all nuclear weapon States to refrain from using nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty.

Pakistan and India should seek admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and accept the MTCR guidelines in their export policies. Both countries should continue to insist on an arms control dialogue with the P5. Pakistan, either unilaterally, — or with India, should propose a global summit on nuclear weapons and doctrines.

The focus should be on getting the USA and Russia to reduce their 25,000 plus warheads to below 1000, at which stage Pakistan and India can join and stabilise their nuclear forces at a minimum credible deterrence.

If the P5 do not attend, then it would confirm they are not serious on nuclear disarmament. It would also show that they seek only to limit or outlaw weapons that threaten them — hence the delegitimisation of Biological and Chemical weapons — but seek to keep nuclear weapons for themselves, while pushing non-proliferation for others.

This is where there are more long-term opportunities for Pakistan and India. Pakistan has been suggesting a bilateral nuclear, missile and conventional restraint regime, and, at least one of the proposals is finally going to be operationalised — that is, the provision of prior and adequate notification of flight tests of missiles.

Both countries also have an agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities and lists are exchanged in December every year. These lists can be made more inclusive. A joint regional test ban moratorium can be agreed upon if a treaty is not possible - which could be made trilateral to include China.

Both countries need to make a commitment not to acquire BMD systems — this is the single most destabilising threat to the present nuclear deterrence. There could be a bilateral Nuclear Suppliers’ Agreement perhaps where Pakistan and India agree to a list similar to the present NSG’s list.

Both need to agree to the institution of a permanent strategic nuclear dialogue. As for nuclear disarmament, this would only undermine the deterrence and lead to an expensive arms race in the region which Pakistan can ill-afford and cannot possibly reach a balance in terms of conventional force structures.

If at all there has to be some move towards nuclear disarmament, then it must begin with the unravelling of alliances like NATO. Only then can one actually take the nuclear disarmament question seriously.●

© 2005 Shireen M Mazari